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Ferry Troubled Waters: A Systems Engineering perspective on the Spirit of Tasmania docking challenges

In this instalment of our blog series, we take a step into the world of Systems Engineering and Assurance (SESA) to explore the well-documented infrastructure challenges faced by the Spirit of Tasmania as it introduced its new generation of vessels. While the story has attracted headlines, it also serves as a case study in how complex systems can falter when not approached as a cohesive whole.  

Background: Big ships, incomplete infrastructure 

The operator of the Spirit of Tasmania ferry service commissioned new, larger vessels to boost passenger and freight capacity on the Bass Strait route. The first state-of-the-art ferry (Spirit of Tasmania IV) has been delivered on schedule from Europe, only to encounter a major problem: the Devonport terminal was not ready for its arrival. Despite the vessel travelling to Devonport on time, essential upgrades to the Devonport docking facilities lagged. The result? A significant misalignment between vessel delivery and infrastructure readiness. 

Consequences of the delay 

The consequences of the disjointed delivery were both immediate and expensive. With the new vessels unable to operate as planned, demurrage and holding costs quickly mounted - essentially paying for the ship to sit idle. Customer confidence also took a hit, as long-promised service improvements were suddenly out of reach. In the meantime, the operator was forced to rely on outdated infrastructure at 1 East Berth, requiring costly temporary adaptations and operational workarounds. Despite these efforts, the core issue remained: the upgrade failed to deliver the additional passenger or freight capacity that Tasmania was counting on. 

Frustration rippled across stakeholder groups. Tasmanian exporters, businesses, and the travelling public, all of whom had anticipated greater capacity and reliability, were left waiting. What was meant to be a milestone in transport capability turned into a cautionary tale about the cost of poor integration and misaligned program delivery.  

Where robust systems engineering processes could make a difference 

From a systems engineering and assurance perspective, this situation serves as a textbook example of what can go wrong when complex, interdependent elements are delivered in isolation. Rather than being treated as a cohesive system-of-systems, the vessel program and terminal upgrades were managed on separate tracks. This lack of integration introduced significant misalignments between infrastructure and vessel capabilities, undermining the overall effectiveness of the investment. 

Several systemic issues stand out. Given the disconnect between vessel delivery and terminal works readiness, once conclusion drawn could be that the terminal works appear to have been conceived as standalone civil construction projects, with limited regard for their role within a broader, interconnected transport system. As a result, critical design requirements driven by the operational needs of the new vessels were either missed or poorly defined. Coordination between key stakeholders; shipbuilders, infrastructure contractors, the operator and the port owner, also appears to have faltered which highlights a breakdown in interface management and a lack of clear requirements traceability. The outcome reflects the risks inherent in siloed project thinking and underscores the importance of integrated delivery approaches for large-scale infrastructure programs.  

Assurance gaps: What was missing? 

While an external perspective has its limitations, several assurance shortfalls likely played a role in the breakdown. One of the most apparent was the lack of progressive assurance - there seemed to be no clear linkage between infrastructure delivery milestones and the readiness of the vessels to enter service. This gap made it difficult to track how each element was contributing to the overall system outcome. 

Integration reviews perhaps may have been weak or under-prioritised. Opportunities to test alignment across key system boundaries (i.e. between vessels, terminals, and supporting infrastructure) were perhaps missed or insufficiently robust. Governance added another layer of complexity: risk and responsibility were spread across multiple entities, with no single party clearly accountable for integration oversight. 

Avoiding history repeating: Better practice for future projects 

To avoid similar pitfalls in future maritime or transport infrastructure projects, a more disciplined, systems-based delivery approach is essential. Programs of this scale and complexity must be treated as integrated systems-of-systems; where vessels, terminals, logistics, digital platforms, and regulatory pathways are planned and delivered in sync. Fragmented timelines and siloed workstreams simply introduce too much risk. 

Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) can also play a critical role here, helping teams trace requirements from concept through to delivery, via use of a System Architecture model, to help ensure that specifications, designs and construction activities genuinely reflect and deliver the operational needs. The application of a MBSE approach also supports progressive decomposition and interface Identification such that clear relationship responsibilities can be attributed. 

Embedding assurance gates - structured review points throughout the lifecycle against a defined criteria and/or assurance case - adds another layer of confidence by progressively evaluating and confirming readiness, highlighting areas of risk and managing crosscutting dependencies.  

Just as important are strong interface agreements that clearly outline roles, responsibilities, and integration boundaries across all delivery partners. And finally, schedule risk must be actively managed from the outset through critical path modelling, scenario planning, and robust contingencies. With the right systems thinking, future projects can avoid the missteps seen here and deliver on their full promise.  

Conclusion 

The key lesson from Devonport’s experience is that infrastructure and asset renewal must be treated as an integrated system. Vessels, terminals, logistics chains, and user experience are not isolated investments; they are interdependent components of a broader capability. When assurance frameworks do not connect those components, the entire system is vulnerable to costly misalignments and service delivery failures. 

Stay tuned for Part 2, where we shift focus from port infrastructure to vessels, exploring integration challenges and lessons from a maritime systems engineering viewpoint.  

Bibliography:  

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-06-22/one-delayed-spirit-of-tasmania-ship-to-arrive-in-august/105446710 

https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2025/jun/09/spirit-of-tasmania-ferry-stranded-leith-scotland-jeremy-rockliff-tourist-attraction 

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-01-17/spirit-of-tasmania-move-from-scotland-decision-pending/104829182 

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-12-02/spirit-of-tasmania-iv-travels-from-finland-to-scotland/104671806 

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn045ld91yzo